"We all have been harmed. Today more than ever we need unity," said former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani during Friday prayers at Tehran University on July 17. It was a crucial sermon and, in the manner of many things Persian, purposefully and delicately opaque. Some thought Rafsanjani's speech was a direct threat to the Ahmadi-Khamenei regime. He demanded the release of political prisoners, an end to violence against protesters, the restoration of Iran's (intermittently) free press. Others thought Rafsanjani, speaking with the approval of the Supreme Leader, was trying to build a bridge between the opposition and the regime. For me, it brought back memories of a less opaque Friday-prayers sermon I'd actually seen Rafsanjani deliver in December 2001, in which he spoke of the need for an "Islamic bomb."(See a video of Klein discussing Iran's election.)
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The signature foreign policy initiative of Barack Obama's presidential campaign was his desire to begin negotiations with Iran. It was ridiculed by John McCain and by Hillary Clinton, now his Secretary of State. Obama persisted, with reason: it was a good idea. How he proceeds now, after Iran's brutal electoral debacle, could be the most important foreign policy decision of his presidency. As Clinton made clear in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations two days before Rafsanjani spoke, the Obama Administration has not wavered in its desire for talks. And yet, the body language has changed.(See pictures of people around the world protesting Iran's election.)
Before the June election, Administration officials spoke of pursuing "comprehensive" talks. They believed the Iranians would discuss their nuclear program only in the context of talks that established Iran as a major player, and necessary interlocutor, on regional issues like Afghanistan and Iraq. There were possible areas for cooperation, especially in Afghanistan. The Iranians showed little appetite for such talks, but it was assumed that an opening would come after the election (although even the Iranian reformers I spoke with were demanding U.S. concessions in advance of negotiations).
Of course, the idea of making any sort of introductory concession seems quite impossible now. In fact, you don't hear Administration officials talking about "comprehensive" negotiations anymore. The focus is almost solely on the nuclear issue. "We face a real-time challenge on nuclear proliferation in Iran," the President said at the G-8 summit. "And we're deeply troubled by the proliferation risks Iran's nuclear program poses to the world." Obama offered a "path" to peace for Iran via the ongoing Geneva negotiations, which seemed a more restrictive corridor than comprehensive talks. He set a September deadline for an Iranian response, after which there would be a renewed push for economic sanctions — which was pretty much where George W. Bush left things.(See the top 10 players in Iran's power struggle.)
This emphasis on the nuclear issue is disproportionate. Iran is allowed to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The latest National Intelligence Estimate suggests that Iran doesn't have a nuclear-weapons program — although it once did, and could easily resume weaponization at any time. But let's assume the worst: say Iran is working on a bomb; say it acquires one in the next few years. Only Benjamin Netanyahu and assorted American neoconservatives believe — or pretend to believe — that Iran might actually use it, given Israel's overpowering ability to strike back. Most observers think that the Iranians would hold their weapon as a deterrent — even Rafsanjani, in his "Islamic bomb" speech, posited that the weapon would create a regional "stalemate." To be sure, an Iranian bomb would not be a good thing. It might launch a Middle Eastern arms race among Iran's Sunni rivals in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. But it would not be cataclysmic, either — unless Obama decided to pre-empt it militarily. In any case, the question is, Does the President really want to paint himself into this corner? Does he want to face the possibility of going to war or, more likely, retreating from his insistence on a bomb-free Iran?(See pictures of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's supporters on LIFE.com.)
A wiser alternative may be to stand down, for a while. "Turn away and whistle," an Iranian academic suggested recently. Don't abandon the nuclear-sanctions process, but don't force it, either. Don't pursue negotiations. Let the disgraced Iranian government pursue us, as it might, in order to rebuild credibility at home and in the world — and then make sure the regime's interest isn't just for show. After all, Iran isn't the most frightening nuclear challenge we're facing. That would be the next country over, Pakistan. In the latest National Interest, Bruce Riedel — who led the Obama Administration's Afghanistan and Pakistan policy review — suggests that a coup led by Islamist, Taliban-sympathetic elements of the Pakistani army remains a real possibility. Pakistan has at least 60 nuclear weapons. The chance that al-Qaeda sympathizers might gain access to those weapons is the real issue in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For the moment, it is far more important than anything happening in Iran.
